Wrapped Ether
Scanned August 31, 2026 · Check a different contract →
Wrapped Ether
How the owner could rug you
None of the common owner-side rug mechanisms were found in the code. That is not a clean bill of health — see the limits below.
This checks only what the code can do. It cannot see whether liquidity is locked, how concentrated holders are, or what the team intends — those need live on-chain data. Absence of these mechanisms is not proof a token is safe.
What this could cost you
How much money would you put into this? We'll show you what you could actually lose — in dollars, not just a scary word like "risk."
None of the common rug mechanisms were found, so there's nothing to calculate against here. That's not the same as "safe" — see the limits above.
This contract's source is 38,401 characters — only the first 9,000 were analyzed, so parts of it were not examined. That's the real reason, not a vague size limit: 29,401 characters were cut off the end.
What the code allows
Evidence: No mint() or similar function; tokens are minted only when ether is sent to deposit() which credits the sender
Evidence: No owner state variable, no onlyOwner modifier, and no functions restricted to a privileged address
Evidence: transfer() and transferFrom() only require sufficient balance and allowance; no pausable or blacklist checks
Evidence: Balance adjustments are direct subtraction/addition of the exact wad amount; no fee calculations
Evidence: No proxy pattern, delegatecall, or admin address; contract is self‑contained
Evidence: No pause flag or modifier used in transfer functions
Evidence: No owner variable defined; contract has no concept of ownership
Worth reading yourself
- ›fallback function () public payable { deposit(); }
- ›function deposit() public payable { balanceOf[msg.sender] += msg.value; Deposit(msg.sender, msg.value); }
- ›function withdraw(uint wad) public { require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= wad); balanceOf[msg.sender] -= wad; msg.sender.transfer(wad); Withdrawal(msg.sender, wad); }
- ›function totalSupply() public view returns (uint) { return this.balance; }
What this did not check
- ›Source code was truncated at 9000 characters; any code beyond the visible portion could not be analyzed. Liquidity lock status, holder concentration, and actual on‑chain balances are not visible in the source and were not checked.
Automated review of verified source only. Not an audit. Does not cover on-chain state, holder distribution, liquidity, or deployer behavior. It cannot tell you whether a token is safe or whether to buy it. Absence of a finding is not evidence that a contract is sound — it may mean the relevant code was not readable, not verified, or not reached.
Want more than the free read?
A real security researcher personally reads this contract's verified source — not an automated re-run of the free check.
What's checked
The same 7 owner-power categories as the free check — mint authority, ability to disable trading, blacklist power, mutable fees, upgradeability, privileged withdrawal, and whether ownership is still active — plus 4 categories the free tier doesn't cover: exact current fee values and where they're set, whether ownership itself can be transferred (and to whom), any hardcoded or owner-settable exceptions to fees/limits/blacklist, and external contracts this one calls out to and trusts.
How it's done
I read the contract's actual verified source directly — no token-window truncation, since a person isn't limited by an LLM's context size the way the free tier is. Every finding cites the specific function or modifier it comes from; if the code doesn't determine something, the report says so instead of guessing.
What you get
A written report emailed to you within 24 hours: a plain-English summary, every finding with its evidence, and what the review could not determine from source alone.
Disclaimer: this is a capability review of verified source code, not a formal security audit and not investment advice. It reports what the contract's owner/admin technically CAN do — it does not check on-chain state, liquidity depth, holder concentration, or deployer behavior, and it does not certify a contract as safe.
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This is a surface read
It reports capabilities visible in source. It does not model economics, test exploit paths, or reason about how contracts interact. A real review does — with runnable proofs for anything it claims.
Request a security review →Paid reviews go further than this free scan: every finding is signed, timestamped, and hash-chained into a record — self-scored 16/20 against an independent standard →