CONTRACT ANALYSIS

FiatTokenV2_2

Scanned October 2, 2026 · Check a different contract →

Code review

FiatTokenV2_2

Arbitrum · 0xF197FFC2…164C80aA
View source →
3
capabilities present
4
undetermined
7
checks run
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🧬Structurally similar to a known scam: SQUID (Squid Game token)

Netflix-tie-in token, Nov 2021. Price went $0.01 to $2,861 then to zero in minutes when developers pulled $3.38M from the liquidity pool. Deployed bytecode (verified 2026-09-28) shows an owner-only blacklist, an upgrade function disguised as "approveTo", and a hidden wallet role that can burn tokens from any address, including the liquidity pool.

This means the same combination of owner powers is present (95% structural match) — not that this is the same code, or that it will do the same thing. See the reference case →

🪤

How the owner could rug you

3 owner powers found that could be used against holders. Each is a capability the code grants — not proof of intent.

🔴Owner/blacklister can freeze specific addresses
Yes · high

The blacklister (controlled by the owner) can add any address to the blacklist, making its tokens non‑transferable.

Code: Modifier `onlyBlacklister` and internal function `_setBlacklistState` manipulate the high‑bit blacklist flag; `blacklist(address)` function is declared in the inherited `Blacklistable` contract.

🔴Owner or rescuer can withdraw tokens held by the contract
Yes · high

The owner can appoint a rescuer who can pull out any ERC20 tokens mistakenly sent to the contract, potentially including the token itself if it were held.

Code: `Rescuable.rescueERC20` allows the designated rescuer to transfer any ERC20 token from this contract; `updateRescuer` is `onlyOwner`.

🟡Owner retains privileged powers
Yes

The owner can continue to change critical parameters (e.g., rescuer, blacklister) and potentially pause the contract.

Code: `updateRescuer` uses the `onlyOwner` modifier, showing the owner can still execute privileged actions; no renounceOwnership call is visible.

❔Owner can mint new tokens
Undetermined

Code: No mint or _mint function visible in the provided snippet; mint capability may exist in inherited contracts not shown.

❔Owner can pause or disable transfers
Undetermined

Code: Functions use the `whenNotPaused` modifier, but the pause/unpause functions themselves are not present in the visible code.

❔Owner can change transfer fees or taxes
Undetermined

Code: No fee‑related state variables or functions are visible; fee logic may be in omitted parent contracts.

❔Contract logic can be swapped via proxy
Undetermined

Code: The note mentions a proxy, but no admin‑upgrade functions are present in the shown implementation.

This checks only what the code can do. It cannot see whether liquidity is locked, how concentrated holders are, or what the team intends — those need live on-chain data. Absence of these mechanisms is not proof a token is safe.

What this could cost you

How much money would you put into this? We'll show you what you could actually lose — in dollars, not just a scary word like "risk."

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Scope of this review

This is a proxy contract. The findings below describe the implementation at 0x72beddf7032eec58f199857b79a8e37020c14e42. The implementation can be swapped for different code by whoever controls the upgrade mechanism.

This contract's code is 34,539 characters (after removing comments and whitespace) — only the first 9,000 were analyzed, so parts of it were not examined. That's the real reason, not a vague size limit: 25,539 characters were cut off the end. The contract's own code was read first, so what was cut is mostly shared library code.

What the code allows

Owner privileged functions
Present

Evidence: `updateRescuer` is protected by `onlyOwner`; `onlyBlacklister` also derives from `Ownable`.

This allows: Owner can modify critical roles and parameters.

Transfer restrictions via pause and blacklist
Present

Evidence: `whenNotPaused` modifier on transfer‑related functions; `notBlacklisted` modifier checks blacklist status.

This allows: Transfers can be blocked globally or per address.

Current ownership status
Present

Evidence: `onlyOwner` modifier is active on `updateRescuer`; no renounceOwnership call is visible.

This allows: Owner still holds control over privileged actions.

Mint authority
Undetermined

Evidence: No minting function found in the excerpt; could be defined in parent contracts.

This allows: If minting is allowed, the supply can be increased at will.

Transfer fee/tax mechanism
Undetermined

Evidence: No fee variables or fee‑adjusting functions appear in the visible code.

This allows: A mutable fee could be used to confiscate tokens on each transfer.

Proxy upgradeability
Undetermined

Evidence: Proxy note present, but no admin upgrade functions are shown.

This allows: Upgradeability allows future logic changes.

Pausable mechanism
Undetermined

Evidence: `whenNotPaused` is used, but pause/unpause functions are not in the excerpt.

This allows: Pausing can halt all token activity.

Worth reading yourself

  • ›Bitmask blacklist implementation using the high bit of the balance storage (`balanceAndBlacklistStates`) to store blacklist status.
  • ›`initializeV2_2` blacklists a list of accounts and the contract itself, then deletes the deprecated blacklist mapping.
  • ›`Rescuable` contract gives a designated rescuer the ability to transfer any ERC20 token out of the contract via `rescueERC20`.

What this did not check

  • ›Source code was truncated at 9000 characters; functions and modifiers that appear later (e.g., mint, pause/unpause, upgrade logic, fee configuration) could not be examined.
  • ›Liquidity lock status, holder concentration, and actual on‑chain balances are not visible in the source and were not checked.

Automated review of verified source only. Not an audit. Does not cover on-chain state, holder distribution, liquidity, or deployer behavior. It cannot tell you whether a token is safe or whether to buy it. Absence of a finding is not evidence that a contract is sound — it may mean the relevant code was not readable, not verified, or not reached.

Want more than the free read?

A real security researcher personally reads this contract's verified source — not an automated re-run of the free check.

What's checked

The same 7 owner-power categories as the free check — mint authority, ability to disable trading, blacklist power, mutable fees, upgradeability, privileged withdrawal, and whether ownership is still active — plus 4 categories the free tier doesn't cover: exact current fee values and where they're set, whether ownership itself can be transferred (and to whom), any hardcoded or owner-settable exceptions to fees/limits/blacklist, and external contracts this one calls out to and trusts.

How it's done

I read the contract's actual verified source directly — no token-window truncation, since a person isn't limited by an LLM's context size the way the free tier is. Every finding cites the specific function or modifier it comes from; if the code doesn't determine something, the report says so instead of guessing.

What you get

A written report emailed to you within 24 hours: a plain-English summary, every finding with its evidence, and what the review could not determine from source alone.

Disclaimer: this is a capability review of verified source code, not a formal security audit and not investment advice. It reports what the contract's owner/admin technically CAN do — it does not check on-chain state, liquidity depth, holder concentration, or deployer behavior, and it does not certify a contract as safe.

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This is a surface read

It reports capabilities visible in source. It does not model economics, test exploit paths, or reason about how contracts interact. A real review does — with runnable proofs for anything it claims.

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